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Summary  findings
The rnost important challenge of Estonia's strategy for  Estonian authorities are justified in tightening
integrating its financial sector with that of the  prudential regulation and supervision because of the risks
European  Union (EU) is to upgrade its capacity for  associated with an overheating economy, general market
prudential regulation and supervision enough to gain  volatility, and the possible deterioration  in the quality of
recognition from its EU counterparts.  credit.
Doing so is also a crucial complement to Estonia's  Improvements in prudential regulation should be
strategy for strengthening macroeconomic policy and  followed by improvements in the country's capacity to
stabilization - especially because, under a currency  supervise banks and an upgrading of the banks' risk
board, its banks are a central part of the transmission  management systems, to manage the increasingly
mechanism for capital flows.  complex operations and diverse markets in which they
Under the currency board banks have been able to  engage. These steps should be a priority. The
arbitrage between domestic and foreign financial markets  institutional development of banks and supervision have
- increasingly  funding themselves from abroad. Such  lagged behind market developments.
arbitrage has become the key funding source for rapidly  In improving the regulatory framework for banks,
expanding credit, contributing to the country's large  Estonia should avoid establishing incentives for tax
current account deficit.  arbitrage that lead to the creation of artificial and socially
costly financial intermediaries.
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TSE  Tallinn  Stock ExchangeI.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Estonia's  road  to  financial  integration  leads  to  two  broadly  defined  reform
agendas: improving risk management, and bridging the regulatory and institutional gaps
with the EU.  These are complementary agendas.  Financial integration will increase the
intricacy and diversity of financial contracts, making risk management more important
and challenging.  Meeting EU regulatory and supervisory requirements will create the
opportunity for financial institutions, supervisors, and regulators to substantially upgrade
their institutional capacity to monitor and manage risk.  This chapter therefore identifies
the main challenges and risks entailed by financial integration, and outlines a strategy to
bridge  the  regulatory  gaps  with  the  EU.  The  proposed  strategy  is  based  on  the
strengthening  of  prudential  regulation  and  supervision,  taking  into  account  key
macroeconomic-related risks.  Indeed, we argue that internalizing financial sector policies
is an integral part of sound macroeconomic fundamentals.
2.  This paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief overview of recent
developments of Estonia's financial sector.  Section III describes the risks and challenges
that  banks  face  when  operating  in  a  more  integrated  financial  market.  Section  IV
describes the EU requirements for the financial sector.  Section V proposes a strategy to
meet EU requirement and improve financial sector risk management.
II.  FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN ESTONIA
3.  The principal factors governing the development of the Estonian financial system
are the currency board arrangement instituted in June 1992, and the 1995 Law on Credit
Institutions  that authorized banks to  operate  as universal banks.  The currency board
arrangement provides banks and other financial institutions with arbitrage opportunities
at  relatively  low  risk,  since  it  entails  an  implicit  exchange  rate  guarantee.  Under
Estonia's currency board arrangement, however, the Bank of Estonia has a limited role as
a lender of last resort.'  This imposes constraints on bank operations, requiring them in
principle to hold sufficient reserves of domestic currency, or assets that can be readily
converted into foreign currency.  Universal banking allows banks to retain an unrivaled
position in the financial system.  Under the 1995 Law on Credit Institutions banks may
own and finance other financial institutions.  Universal banking encourages banks to set
Under  Estonia's  currency  board arrangement,  the Bank of Estonia  may only lend  to commercial  banks in
the event of a general  banking  crisis, or in the context of restructuring  of an individual  bank. In any
one of these events,  the overall  amount  lent is limited  by the excess  reserves  of the Bank of Estonia --
that is, the foreign  reserves  in excess  of the currency  board's requirements.  Also, in the first  years of
operations  of the currency  board, the IMF  programs  place additional  limits  on the Bank of Estonia's
lender  of last resort function  by not allowing  the gap between  reserves  and base  money  to fall entirely
to zero.up non-bank financial subsidiaries, since it provides them the opportunity to  diversify
risk, broaden market  base, and engage in regulatory  arbitrage. 2 The resulting web of
financial institutions however makes bank management, regulation and supervision more
complex.
4.  The summer of 1997 there was a turning point in the development of the Estonian
banking system.  Before the summer of 1997 growth in bank credit was constrained by
the volume of bank deposits (Figure 1).  In the summer of 1997, banks begin extending
credits beyond the limits of their deposit base.  In 1997, bank credit increased by almost
90%, while deposits grew by around 40%.  The main factor contributing to this  change
was bank's  access to  sources of  long term  funding, most  notably  foreign borrowing.
Taking advantage of the very  low real  interest rate  in  industrialized  countries, banks
increased their  issues  of Eurobonds  from  EEK  83 million  at end-1995,  to  EEK  536
million at end-1996, and EEK 2308  million by September 1997 --  a more than four-fold
increase  between end-1996 and September 1997.
- Figure 1: Bank credits and deposits
June  1994 - March  1998  - EEK Million
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5.  The availability of foreign borrowing credit allowed a rapid decline in interest
rates, although, disinflation was also a contributing factor.  Between January  1996 and
October  1997  long-term  and  short-term  nominal  interest  rates  dropped  over  5.5
percentage  points  (Figure  2)  --  though  interest  rates  increased  again  following  the
October 1997 liquidity crunch.  Simultaneously, average bank intermediation margins fell
2  Regulatory  arbitrage  happens whenever  a market participant  engaged  in more than one activity (e.g.,
banks  engaged  in securities  trading)  is allowed  to place one of these activities  under the oversight  of
the regulator  with  the least burdensome  requirements.
3  For instance, Hansapank, Estonia's largest commercial bank, began operations by avoiding lending
altogether,  specializing  instead  in foreign  settlements.
2from 9.9%  in January  1996 to 3.0% in October  1997.  Lower  intermediation margins
reflected greater liquidity in the market and increased competition in the banking sector,
both leading to increased lending volumes.
6.  The  expansion  in  bank  lending  happened  against  a  backdrop  of  improved
regulation and supervision of bank  operations.  Stricter bank regulations were reflected
primarily  in  the  gradual  increase  in  minimum  capital  requirements,  solvency  ratios,
liquidity ratios, loan loss provisions 4,  as well as tighter regulation of credit risks, and
foreign exchange  risks.  This  contributes  to  the consolidation  of  the banking  system.
Weaker  banks  were  forced to  merge  with  stronger  ones,  and  entry was  made  more
difficult.  As a result, the number of commercial banks operating in Estonia fell from  19
in November  1995 to  11 in January  1998.5 Also during this period the Finnish Merita
Bank opened a branch, and  several foreign banks opened representative offices.  Foreign
ownership, however, increased primarily through foreign participation in Estonian banks.
EBRD  took  equity positions  in  Hoiupank  and  Maapank, and the  Swedish  Swedbank
increased its ownership in Hoiupank to just under 20%.
Figure 2: Nominal  Interest Rates on Commercial  Bank Loans in
Estonian  Kroons  - March  94/March 98 -(%)
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7.  Bank access to sources of long term funding entailed significant changes to the
composition  of  their  loan portfolio  (Table  1).  There  was  a  marked  increase  in  the
maturity of loans.  Loans with maturities of five years or more increased from just  under
4  Minimum capital requirements were successively raised to EEK 50 million in January  1996, EEK 60
million in January 1997, and EEK 75 million (approximately ECU 5 million) in January 1998.
5Between  June 1992 and October 1997, 40 banks ceased to operate in Estonia: 6 had their license revoked
because  they  had  never  started  operations;  7  were  declared  bankrupt;  3  decided  on  voluntary
liquidation; 2  had their  license withdrawn; and  22  either merged with or  were  acquired  by other
banks.
33% in December 94 to  18% by September  1997.  Banks broadened their  market base
beyond the corporate sector, extending loans to individuals and financial institutions.  By
September 1997, individuals and financial institutions accounted for 40% of all new bank
loans, compared to just over 10% in December 1994.
Table 1. Loan  Portfolio  of Estonian  Banks
Dec.  Dec.  Dec.  Sept.
1994  1995  1996  1997
Total Loan Portfolio (Dec. 1994 EEK  4,376  5,223  7,986  12,482
Million)
Loans to Government (%)  1.0  1.8  1.5  1.4
Loans to Financial Institutions (%)  0.1  8.9  15.5  20.1
Loans to Corporations (%)  87.8  78.4  67.4  59.4
Loans to Individuals (%)  11.2  10.9  15.7  19.2
Memo items
Share of  loans over one year (%)  49.7  63.0  74.9  75.6
Share of  loans over five years (%)  2.9  5.3  10.1  17.7
8.  The rapid increase in loans to financial institutions was due primarily to bank
financing of affiliated nonbank financial institutions.  These consisted mainly of leasing
companies, investment funds, and insurance companies, but also included brokerage and
asset management firms.  Indeed, the largest (measured by size of assets) Estonian
nonbank financial institutions are owned by the large commercial banks. 6 Financing
these institutions provided banks with the opportunity to diversify risk at a very low cost.
For instance, leasing of consumer durables (cars and other moveable assets) are fully
collateralized, exposing the leasing company to potentially less risk than banks are
exposed in lending.  Owning nonbank financial institutions also allows banks to engage
in regulatory arbitrage, since the activities of nonbank financial institutions are subject to
much less scrutiny than banks.  A bank can therefore shift a transaction to its nonbank
affiliate to elude supervisors.
9.  It is not surprising that banks have played a decisive role in setting up and running
the capital markets in Estonia. 7  The brokerage houses, most of which  are owned by
6  For instance,  according  to the Estonian  Leasing  Companies  Union,  in end-1997,  Hansa  Liising
(Hansapank's  Leasing  company)  controlled  37% of the leasing  services  market,  followed  by
Hoiupanga  Liising  with  22.3%,  Uhisliising  with  21.6%,  Tallinna  Panga  Liising  with  5.8%,  and  Foreks
Liising  with  4.1%. The  independent  leasing  companies  accounted  only  for  the remaining  9.2%  of the
market.  These  included  Toostusliising,  Amserv  Kapital,  and Siemens  Finantseeringute  OU  (Siemens
Financing).
7  The following  paragraphs  draw on the "Estonia  - Note on Capital  Markets",  World  Bank,  mimeo,
December,  1996.
4banks, are the sole owners of the Tallinn Stock Exchange (created in May 1996) and the
Estonian Central Depository (ECD).  Both institutions are self-regulated and provide the
market with well-designed and modem  infrastructure.  The trading system is very safe
and efficient, with next day settlement and all traded securities being dematerialized and
deposited at the ECD. This has contributed to increase the liquidity and confidence in the
market, building a broad base of investors.  Corporations account for over  50% of the
investors in the market, followed by foreigners (over one third), and individuals (about
one-tenth) (see Table 2).
10.  Despite the reliable organization of the capital markets, banks, investment funds
and  brokerage  houses that  operate  in  the  market  are  subject  to  very  low  levels  of
regulation and supervision.  The Securities Inspectorate, which reports to the Ministry of
Finance, has  extensive  powers to  license,  regulate and  supervise  market  participants.
However,  inadequate  regulations,  and  institutional  and  staffing  constraints  implies
relatively ineffective supervision.  The most effective supervision instrument is through
the licensing  securities  firms.  It  requires substantial  disclosure of  balance sheet and
income statements, the background of managers, minimum capital requirements, and the
employment of licensed  (and scarce) securities advisors.  The importance of licensing
could be enhanced, since there is a requirement that licenses be renewed annually.  In
practice, however, renewals are automatic with little or no due diligence by the Securities
Inspectorate.  Meanwhile,  regular  supervision  is  hampered  by  limited  reporting
requirements  and  the  lack  of  specificity  in  rules  for  transparency,  disclosure  of
information, and insider trading.
Table 2: The structure  of the securities  market by issuers  and investors  (%)
and major indicators  of the securities  market in 1995  and 1996
1995  1996
Issuers  Investors  Issuers  Investors
Private  persons  8.0  8.8
Institutional  Investors  94.0  63.0  96.0  56.1
o/w  enterprises  74.6  63.0  86.7  55.4
o/w open sector  19.4  9.3
Non-residents  6.0  29.0  4.0  35.1
Market  capitalization  (EEK million)  3.2  13.2
Capitalization  / GDP  7.7  26.4
Turnover  / Capitalization  2.9  12.5
Source:  Bank of Estonia;  and World  Bank staff estimates.
11.  Estonian  banks  have  been  particularly  active  in  the  Tallinn  Stock  Exchange,
increasing their  funding  through  issues  of equity  and  securities.  The  country's  five
largest banks'  account for  three-quarters of the  volume  and almost  two-thirds  of the
8  Hansapank,  Uhispank,  Hoiupank,  Forekspank,  and  Tallinna  Pank.
5transactions in the market.  These banks therefore are both the largest issuers of traded
equity, and the most active participants.  This has happened in a market that has steadily
grown.  At the end of 1997 over 60 companies had registered their stock, and over 40
companies issued bonds.  Market capitalization equivalent to EEK  18 billion (28% GDP
in end-97), after peaking at EEK 25 million (40% of GDP in end- 1997) in September (see
Box 1).
12.  These developments have entailed recent changes in the policy framework under
which banks and nonbank financial institutions operate.  In view of the fast growth in
credit  expansion,  including  lending  to  nonbank  financial  institutions,  the  Estonian
authorities decided  to  tighten  the  country's  fiscal  stance, as  well  as bank  prudential
regulations.  In end-1997, the Estonian government established a fiscal stabilization fund
by  withdrawing  EEK  700  million  of  its  deposits  in  commercial  banks.  Further
withdrawals are planned in  1998 until the fund reaches EEK  1.9 billion.  In November,
the bank's minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was increased from 8% to 10%, with
possibly a further increase to 12% at a future date.  The tightening of the capital adequacy
ratio also included an increase in  the risk adjustment on loans to local governments from
50% to  100%.  Reserve requirements were extended  to  include net borrowing  from
abroad; the liquidity II ratio 9 was increased from 30% to 35%, and the minimum daily
liquidity (cash in vaults) requirement for banks increased from 20% to 40%.  To avoid
over-taxing the banks, however, legal reserves above the daily minimum were allowed to
be  used  to  offset  liquidity  mismatches  resulting  from  daily  operations  including  the
interbank market.  Similarly, reserves above the daily minimum are remunerated by the
Bank of Estonia at  the Deutsche Bundesbank's  discount rate valid on the last banking
day of the month.'°
9The  ratio of all marketable  assets  with maturities  up to 30 days over contractual  liabilities  up to 30 days.
Marketable  assets include cash, deposits at Bank of Estonia, deposits in OECD country banks,
deposits  in other credit  institutions,  interbank  deposits  and government  bonds.
'0  October  30, 1997,  decree  of the President  of the Bank  of Estonia.
6BOX 1.  THE ESTONIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR IN BRIEF
1.  BANKS
*  12 COMMERCIAL BANKS (MAJORITY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP)  WITH TOTAL ASSETS  OF DEM 4.71
BILLION (AS OF DEC 1, 1997) CA 55-60 % OF GDP, INCLUDING:
3 banks with assets over DEM I billion (Hansapank, Hoiupank (Savings bank) and Uhispank,)
4 banks with assets between DEM 200 million and DEM I billion
4 banks with assets less than DEM 200 million
I branch of foreign bank (Finnish Merita Bank);
*  5  representative  offices  of  foreign  banks  (Bazis  Bank  Ltd.,  Landesbank  Schleswig-Holstein  Girozentrale,
Osuuspankkien Keskuspankki OY, Postipankki OY and Svenska Handelsbanken)
*  Some key indicators (Nov 30, 1997):
Weighted average capital adequacy ratio  13.5%
Weighted average liquidity rate  47.6%
Average return on equity  20.5%
Average return on assets  2.5%
Net Interest margin  3.4%
Average deposit rates  6.2%
Lending rates  11.7%
Short-term interbank loan rates  I week: 13.170%,  1 month 13.0%
Non-performing loans  1.0% of total portfolio of loans - fully provisioned
2.  SECURITIES
*  47 licensed brokerage houses 9 (as of September 30, 1997), of which at least 18 are bank owned
*  Total Tallinn Stock Exchange (TSE) equity market capitalization 1.975 billion DEM (as of Dec 31, 1997)
*  Total TSE turnover: in 1996 0.5 billion DEM, in 1997 3.61 billion DEM.
*  There are 12 publicly traded joint-stock companies on the main list of Tallinn Stock Exchange (of which 5 banks)
and 11 in secondary list (incl. I bank and 2 insurance companies,). In addition public shares of 5 enterprises are
traded on free market.
3.  INSURANCE
*  22 licensed insurance companies, from which  14 non-life insurance, 8 life insurance companies (100% private
ownership).  Major foreign insurance companies on the market (independent subsidiaries or as shareholders) are
Finnish companies Pohjola and Sampo, Swedish Trygg-Hansa, US American International Group (AIG), German
Alte Leipziger Europa, Russian Ingostrahh. All the 22 companies are united in the Association of Insurers. One
company has a license for writing reinsurance business.
*  9 insurance consultants/brokers
*  Agencies of foreign reinsurance companies (Swiss Re Advisers)
*  Premiums collected (I half of 1997) DEM63 mln
*  Major changes are expected to take place in the insurance market in line with the pension reform in the next 3
years
74.  LEGAL BACKGROUND & SUPERVISION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
*  Banking
=  Law  on Bank  of Estonia  (May  1993) establishes the  BoE  independence  in  establishing  and enforcing
prudential regulation through Banking Inspectorate.
>  Capital definitions (capital adequacy ratio), and various liquidity and solvency ratios and exposure limits (to
large loans, connected lending, etc) are established by Law on Credit Institutions (Dec.1994) which is mostly
consistent with EU standards.
=>  Starting from  1998 the Banking Inspectorate is enforcing prudential regulations on consolidated basis, i.e.
supervising  not only  banks but  also  their  financial  subsidiaries,  mainly their  activities in  the securities
market.
t  Draft Deposit Insurance Law is currently in parliament.  According to the draft law small deposits of both
residents and non-residents (with maximum value up to about DEM 2,500 which will be gradually raised to
EU standards of ECU 20,000) will be 90-100% insured. Insurance scheme will be financed by obligatory
annual payments  of  commercial banks  (0.5%  of total value  of  insured  deposits).  The deposits  of  large
enterprises will not be insured (a large enterprise is an enterprise which exceeds two of the following three
criteria: total assets I million ECU, annual net sales 2 million ECU, and number of employees 50).
*  Securities
=>  Securities Market Act (June 1993)
=>  Securities Inspectorate under the Ministry of Finance
=>  TSE has 23 shareholders (II  banks, 10 brokerage firms, Ministry of Finance, Bank of Estonia) of which 18
are member firms. TSE started trading in June 1996.
=>  New draft  Securities Law  will regulate the primary  and secondary  markets,  insider  trading,  and will
introduce minimum capital and capital adequacy requirements for investment funds
*  Insurance
=>  Insurance law (1992)
=  Motor Third Party Liability (TPL) Insurance Law (Dec.1995)
=  Estonian Insurance Supervisory Authority, established  Jan.  1993, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Finance (operating expenses covered by insurance companies at a fixed percentage of their annual insurance
premiums).
s  New draft  of Insurance  Law  is compatible with EU regulations and  contains provisions  on  insurance
supervision, its responsibilities and rights responding to the free market system.
III.  IMPROVING RISK MANAGEMENT
13.  Estonia's integration into the EU will heighten risks to which the banks and other
financial institutions are exposed.  The recent experience in dealing with capital inflows
illustrates this quite well.  Successful integration of the Estonian financial sector into the
EU will hinge on the ability of banks and nonbank financial institutions to improve risk
management,  and  the  capacity  of  bank  regulators  and  supervisors  to  bridge  the
institutional gap with the EU.  This section highlights four main risks that the Estonian
banks will need to manage: output volatility, asset price volatility, liquidity shocks, and
off-balance sheet risks.  The next section examines the regulatory and supervisory gap
between Estonia and the EU, and strategies to bridge this gap.
814.  Output  Volatility  and  Credit  Risk  Management  Under  a  currency  board
arrangement, the loss of exchange rate flexibility to smooth out the recessionary effects of
a monetary tightening, increases the volatility of output.  The increased output volatility
makes it harder to assess the quality of the bank's  loan portfolios.  For example, during
the expansionary part of the cycle the forecasts of borrower's repayment capabilities tend
to be optimistic.  This biased perception may be wrongly validated by the likely decline
in the share of bad loans, which may be also the consequence of fast credit growth.  This
may change dramatically during economic downturns, when borrowers face difficulties in
servicing loans.  Banks may therefore become  more conservative,  contributing to  the
cyclical downturn, and lowering further the quality of banks portfolios.  This problem is
compounded by the fact that the stabilization strategy has prompted rapid credit growth,
which has not been matched by an equally rapid institutional development (neither of the
banks nor of the supervisory authority) to ensure portfolio quality.
15.  Indeed, the fast growth of credit to the private sector (see Table 2) at declining
rates of interest (see Figure 2), raises concerns about the quality of credit.  Even though
the share of overdue loans has more than halved from 3.7% to  1.5% during this period,
the short credit history of Estonian enterprises, the relative inexperience of analysts, and
lack of good internal controls or risk management systems suggest that banks may in fact
not yet be well prepared to differentiate between low risk and high risk projects.  This
problem is compounded by the fact that the current structure of incentives within some of
the banks are strongly geared to reward those actions that lead to gain "market  shares"
rather than to  ensure  the long-term  success  of loan decisions.  While  there  has been
substantial progress and modernization in the large banks, the rush of some banks to gain
market share has not been paralleled by  efforts to improve key functions to manage risk
of lending portfolios and, more generally, asset portfolios.  There has been progress in
areas such as product development and marketing, organizational structures, information
technology,  work-out units,  loan procedures, and credit risk  and account management.
The internal control and auditing functions, however, still need substantial upgrading.
16.  Asset price  volatility.  The absence of an exchange rate cushion under a currency
board implies that market pressures translate more often into asset price volatility.  This
tends to exacerbate banks'  exposure to market risks, particularly interest rate and equity
risks.  The interest rate risk is derived from large maturity mismatches between deposits
and loans.  In Estonia, most deposits are under 3 months, while 76% of the loans are over
one year -- only 5% of the deposits are over  1 year.  A hike in interest rates thus could
rapidly shrink spreads.  Even though semi-annual indexation of most loans to their base
rates or the Tallinn Interbank Offered Rate (TALIBOR) partially compensates  for this
risk, sharp interest rate hikes could severely affect the profitability of commercial banks.
In case the recent hike in interest rates continues or is deepened, the bank's margins could
erode, as their interest receipts may not react sufficiently fast (i.e.; before the indexation
kicks in) to cover for the rising costs of domestic funding of banks.
917.  The equity risk emerges from two different sources: equity held as collateral for
loans granted, and the bank's  own equity holdings  that compose their capital and their
trading portfolio.  The former is a significant source of risk for Estonian banks given the
practice  of granting loans  on margin - that is, using  as collateral stock owned  by the
borrower.  The equity risk  is  accentuated by the high  volatility  of the  Tallinn  Stock
Exchange (TSE).  The Tallinn Stock Exchange (TSE) is small, dominated by relatively
few  listings  (mostly  banks),  and  relies  primarily  on  self-regulation.  The  latter,  in
particular,  increases  the  scope  for  insider trading  which  can  lead  to  a  rapid  loss  of
confidence or concerted anti-competitive operations.  While the growth of the market has
been spectacular until October 1997, the recent correction may have a lasting impact on
the risk perception of small investors and it may take time before confidence returns.
18.  Liquidity  shocks.  The limited role played by the Bank of Estonia as a lender of
last resort  under  the currency  board  arrangement  implies that  Estonian  banks  face  a
greater risk of liquidity shocks.  These liquidity shocks can affect the banking system as a
whole (aggregate shocks), or be limited to one or only a few banks (idiosyncratic shocks).
Aggregate  liquidity  shocks  result  most  often  from  events  that  happen  abroad.  For
instance, the tightening of monetary policy in large industrial countries that leads to an
overall increase in interest rates, or a major crisis in another country or region (e.g., the
recent  East Asia  crisis)  that can  change  investor's  perception  about  the riskyness  of
emerging markets.  Another potential source of aggregate liquidity shocks is a sudden
changes in the government's fiscal position.  The government accounts for around 20% of
deposit in banking system.  A sudden withdrawal to cover a shortfall in revenues or an
unexpected increase  in expenditures could leave some banks, if not the entire banking
system, in  a tighter  liquidity position.  Idiosyncratic liquidity  shocks emerge  from the
change in perception about the solvency of one or a few banks.  Depositor may decide to
withdraw  their  funds  to  protect  their  investment,  leading  to  insolvency.  While
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks can be limited in impact, they are also rapidly transmitted
through the interbank market to the rest of the economy.
19.  A liquidity shock transmitted through the interbank market is, in many ways, one
of the most  important aspect  of the events that  took  place  in  October  1997.  A few
commercial banks  had overextended themselves  and began borrowing  in the interbank
market to fund new operations.  The interbank interest rate increased three-fold  before
transactions  dried  up  (Figure  3).11  In  the  scramble  for  liquidity,  banks  liquidated
investment positions pushing stock prices down.  Lower stock prices forced many banks
to call margin loans, putting further downward pressure on share prices.  The liquidity
crunch only came to an end after some banks agreed to stop calling margin loans.
It is important  to note the importance  of this development.  The virtual lack of public  debt instruments  -
except  for small  amounts  of bank restructuring  government  bonds and municipal  bonds - implies  that
the interbank  market  provides  the benchmark  interest  rates for the majority  of financial  transactions.
10Figure 3. Interbank  interest rates
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20.  The October 1997 experience also illustrates the risks associated with excessive
reliance on foreign sources of funding.  Initially, the fast rise in foreign borrowing by
commercial banks had allowed some reduction in the maturity mismatch.  After October
1997, however, the terms under which Estonian banks have access to foreign sources of
funding has changed very rapidly -as  it happened, to a lesser degree, during the second
half of 1997, in most emerging countries following the Asian crisis.  Long term funding
for three to five years at interests rates less than 100 basis points above the LIBOR is no
longer available,  as it was up to  October 1997.  It  has been replaced by shorter term
funding  (one year or less) for slightly higher rates, or funds with  longer maturities  at
substantially higher rates -- junk  bond  grade.  Estonian banks have chosen  to  shift to
short-term borrowing  (Figure  4),  rather than  pay  much  higher  rates  on their  foreign
borrowing.  Beginning  in October  1997, the share short term borrowing  in total  bank
borrowing increased from around 25% to almost 50%, and continued increasing gradually
from this new level.
21.  Shorter maturities on foreign borrowing expose banks to the risk of clustering of
repayments.  Indeed, if short term credits cannot be renewed, the decline in reserves of
the Bank of Estonia leads to a proportional  reduction in base money and a tightening in
liquidity conditions. To some degree that happened in January 1998, when the repayment
of foreign credits by Estonian banks accounted for a large share of the 8% decline in the
reserves of the Bank of Estonia, and the matching 12% drop in base money.  A greater
clustering of repayments  of short term  credit some time  in the future would  lead to  a
sharper  tightening  in  liquidity  that  would  raise  interest  rates  higher,  hurting  bank
profitability and affecting the quality of loan portfolios.
22.  Contagion, consolidation and exit strategies.  The tightening of regulations and
the strengthening of supervision standards has contributed to the  rapid consolidation of
the banking sector.  Also, the Bank of Estonia has encouraged banks unable to meet the
stiffer operating requirements to merge with  stronger banks, providing,  in some cases,
guarantees to  facilitate these mergers.  This consolidation continues to  gather pace as
1-financial  integration  deepens.  The  merger  of  the  first  and  the  third  largest  banks
(Hansapank  and Houipank)  and the  second and the  fifth largest banks  (Uhispank and
Tallinna Pank) have already been announced.  The resulting banks will account for over
two-thirds of the Estonian banking market.  Regulators and supervisors will come under
increased pressure to  monitor the activities  of very  large banks, while still overseeing
smaller and more fragile banks.  It is important therefore that the process to deal with
insolvent institutions  be  unambiguously spelled  out.  Authorities  should take  steps to
ensure that management will always lose their jobs  and shareholders their capital in the
event of failure.  This  will  greatly reduce the moral hazard  associated with  operating
banks,  minimizing  the  potential  contagion  effect.  Banking  prudential  regulations,
particularly  the mechanisms  of intervention  and/or liquidation  of  institutions  and  the
deposit insurance law, are at the core of macroeconomic management.
23.  Foreign Competition.  The scenarios for consolidation of the Estonian banking
system also need to  account for the increase in  foreign competition.  While the larger
Estonian banks appear to be prepared to operate in the more competitive environment that
will  emerge  with  EU integration,' 2 they  should  expect flatter  margins  and  increased
volatility.  More importantly, they should expect greater competition in other financial
subsectors  such  as  insurance and  brokerage.  In these  subsectors  the  size  of foreign
companies,  as  well  as  technological,  organizational  and  marketing  skills  will  place
foreign companies at a significant advantage.  The greater competition in the financial
system may also accentuate the usual problems associated  with the implementation  of
deposit insurance for all banks, as EU Directives require, adding new stresses to Estonia's
consolidated supervision structure.
24.  Off-balance sheet risks.  Intense competitive pressures has already led banks to
meet more sophisticated liquidity and risks management  needs of their clients through
off-balance sheet operations.  These include loan commitments, credit lines, guarantees,
swaps and hedging transactions, and securities underwriting.3 Some of these operations
are aimed  at increasing  income fees, others allow banks to escape regulations  such as
minimum  capital  requirements.  Tightening  regulations  therefore  can  only  partially
address the risks that result from off-balance sheet operations.  To deal with risks that
derive from financial innovations regulators need to encourage the flow of information
between banks and supervisors, harmonize rules between markets, develop meaningful
and  transparent  accounting  standards,  and  establish  adequate  documentation  for  new
instruments.  Indeed, a market-oriented, risk-based framework is what is intended with
the a  1995 amendment to the Basle Capital Accord.  Under this amendment banks will
have to incorporate capital charges for the market risk arising from their trading activities
12  The free entry of branches and subsidiaries of much larger foreign banks has always been allowed.
l 3From  an accounting point of view, none of these operations correspond to a genuine liability (or asset)
for the bank, only to a random cash flow.  This is why they are classified as off-balance sheet
operations.
12and from their open positions  in foreign exchange and commodities.  The amendment
permits  banks  to  use  their  own internal models  as a  basis  for  measuring  risk as  an
alternative to using a standardized measurement framework.  As Estonia moves to adopt
the new standards for market risk (which are already part of the EU capital Adequacy
Directive),  Estonian  banks  will  have  to  move  fast  to  implement  risk  management
systems.  At present, most  banks still do not  run control systems to  monitor the risk
derived from their off-balance sheet activities, especially derivatives.  Similar weaknesses
in the  Banking  Supervision  Department of  the Bank  of  Estonia  also  means that  the
resulting risks can go unchecked.
IV.  BRIDGING THE REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL GAPS WITH
THE EU
25.  The  other  important  step  toward  financial  integration  is  bridging  Estonia's
regulatory and institutional  gaps with the EU.  This step is important for two reasons.
First, the EU will not  establish a EU level  regulatory body.  It will rely, instead, on
national financial supervision bodies.  The harmonization of financial sector legislation
with EU Directives is therefore essential to allow international transactions to be carried
out  without  running  into  to  conflicting  rules  and  regulations.  Second,  a  reliable
regulatory framework is key for adequate risk management, particularly, in view of the
expected high volatility resulting both from Estonia's  currency board arrangement and
increases competition in the EU single market.
26.  EU financial  sector  Directives.  The  EU  financial  sector  Directives  aim  at
"coordinating the minimum requirements for the different type of institutions in order to
create a minimum standard and a more level playing field as the basis for home country
control  and the single  license"." 4 The EU White  Paper  - Preparation  of Central  and
Eastern Europe countries for integration into the internal market of the EU - proposes to
address the measures for harmonization in two stages (see Table 3).  Stage one concerns
all those measures that address fundamental principles and provide the overall framework
for more detailed legislation.  Stage two consists of measures to reinforce the prudential
regulation and are more closely linked with  the creation of the EU's  internal market.
However, the order in which the measures are de facto  implemented should ultimately
depend on the specific needs of Estonia's financial sector.
27.  The following paragraphs examine the EU  1992 program for complete financial
market  integration in  banking, insurance  and  securities.  In doing  so, they  highlight
Estonia's key legal harmonization and institutional gaps vis a vis EU Directives.
28.  Banking.  The EU financial integration program covers two broadly defined sets
of regulations.  The first set  includes a series of Directives issued between  1977 and
14  Financial Services Chapter of the White Paper, European Commission.
131989 dealing with basic harmonization issues such as common annual account formats,
consolidation requirements, own funds definitions, solvency, common standards for bank
licenses and disclosure requirements for foreign branches. The second set of regulations,
known as the second banking Directive, is the core regulation enabling a single market in
banking. It was issued in December 15, 1989 and has been effective since January 1993.
Table 3.  EU Financial Sector Directives
Banking  Capital markets  Insurance
Stage I  First Banking Directive - 1977  Public Offer Prospectus  First Non-Life Insurance
Own Funds Directive - 1989  Directive  - 1989  Directive - 1973
Solvency Ratio Directive - 1989  Stock Exchange Listing  First Life Insurance Directive
Deposit Guarantee Directive  Directive - 1979  - 1979
- 1994  Major Holding Notification  Annual Accounts and Consoli-
Money Laundering Directive  Directive - 1988  dated Accounts Directive
- 1991  Insider Trading Directive  - 1991
- 1989  Money Laundering Directive




Stage II  Second Banking Directive - 1989  Investment Services Directive  Third Council Non-Life
Large Exposures Directive  - 1993  Insurance Directive - 1992
- 1992  Capital Adequacy Directive  Third Council Life Insurance







29.  The Second Banking  Directive.  The  second Directive  defines the three  main
principles for banking operations in the EU: (i) a common minimum capital requirement -
ECU 5 million for new banks; (ii) a single banking license; and (iii) the principle of home
country control.  The single banking license allows a bank  licensed in any  of the EU
countries to provide services and establish branches in all other countries without any
need  for permission from the  host  country.  The principle of home  country control
authorizes credit institutions to perform activities anywhere in the EU.  Since there is not
going to be an EU wide supervision authority, the common licensing procedure raises the
issue who would supervise banking activities by foreign credit institutions.  Host country
supervision is  not really  possible  because of the  liberal attitude towards  cross-border
services and  branching.  This  Directive  therefore  introduces  the  concept  of  mutual
recognition,  coupled  with  the  requirement  to  supervise  credit  institutions  on  a
consolidated basis.  Supervision is to be performed by the home country and  will be
recognized as  adequate by all  countries  in which  the institution  under  supervision  is
active.  However, while overall solvency of the bank is the responsibility of the home
country, the liquidity in the branches is supervised by the host country.
1430.  Mutual recognition of supervisory authorities.  For mutual recognition to work
some  assurances  of  minimum  quality  supervision  are  clearly  necessary  to  avoid
regulatory arbitrage.  A series of Directives has attempted to impose minimum prudential
standards across the EU.  These Directives established common rules on investments," 5
connected  lending  exposure,  and  aggregate  large  loan  exposure. 16 Moreover,  these
Directive establish common definitions of capital," 7 and a common approach to prudential
regulation, implementing the Basle standards for capital adequacy.' 8
31.  Capital  adequacy.  The  Capital  Adequacy  Directive  covers  both  the  capital
adequacy of credit institutions and investment firms.  It deals with risks other than credit
risk, that is covered under the Solvency Directive.  This Directive affects the trading book
of a bank and the capital of a bank to position risk.  The latter includes hedged positions
(which carry much reduced requirements), foreign exchange rate risk, and settlement risk.
Also, to insure a level playing field, common standards for deposit insurance have been
imposed requiring deposits of up to ECU 20,000 to be insured.
32.  This network of regulations is clearly essential for EU-wide financial integration
to  work  effectively  without  increasing  financial  system  fragility,  maintaining  the
soundness  of the  banking  system.  It  is  not  obvious  this  will be  enough,  as  higher
competition will eventually lead to lower profit margins and more risk taking by banks.
The USA and the UK are examples of how increased competition leads to higher quality
and lower costs of services, but also to a more crisis prone financial system.  Hence the
importance of adequate supervision.  In banking, this is likely to be the main sticking
point during accession negotiations.
33.  What are  the  gaps  in  the  Estonia  banking legislation?  Estonia's  legislative
harmonization  efforts  in  the  area  of  banking  are  noteworthy.  Most  EU  Directives
concerning credit  risk  - large  exposures, connected lending,  definition of own  funds,
solvency  and  liquidity  ratios  - as  well  as  investment  restrictions  and  other  EU
requirements - such as prevention of money laundering and banking secrecy - have been
already incorporated into applicable legislation.  The remaining legal harmonization gap
is  going  to  be  significantly narrowed  after many  of the requirements  detailed  in the
Capital Adequacy Directive - which have already been regulated - are implemented by
the new  Banking Law  - expected to  be  passed  during  1998.  The changes proposed
include primarily prudential regulation concerning market (non-credit) risks such as: off-
5  The maximum  share a bank can hold in a single non-financial  firm is 15% of its own funds, and these
shareholdings  cannot cumulatively  exceed  60%.
16  Large  loan  exposure  cannot  exceed  25% of own funds  to a single  borrower,  and 800%  on aggregate.
17  The Own Funds  Directive  distinguishes  between  core  and supplementary  capital.
18 Bank's own  funds should be at least 8%  of risk-adjusted  value of assets  and off-balance  sheet  business.
15balance sheet risks, underwriting commitment risks, derivative risks, and equity position
(own and trading portfolio) risks.'9 Also, the Bank of Estonia plans to introduce reporting
requirements for consolidated supervision, and a deposit insurance law. 20
34.  Capital Markets.  The capital markets Directive focuses on establishing general
principles  underlying  the  operations  of  capital  markets.  This  includes  adequate
information provision to  the public and equal treatment of investors.  Rules were also
established  on  price  manipulation,  secrecy  and  publication  requirements  for  listed
companies, and minority shareholder rights  in case of takeovers.  Listing requirements
include  minimum  size,  the  obligation  to  publish  annual  reports  satisfying  certain
standards, and the duty to publish price sensitive information forthwith.  Later Directives
addressed the emergence of new types  of investment companies and issues concerning
mutual recognition and information requirements.
35.  The  key  Directive  in  the  capital  markets  is  the  1993  Investment  Services
Directive.  It is equivalent to the second banking Directive.  This Directive established the
single license rule, mutual recognition and home member state supervision for investment
firns.  It allows  firms (brokerage houses, portfolio managers, professional investment
advisors, etc.) to offer their services throughout Europe.  It is similar to the license banks
received  to  engage  in  securities  activities  on  a  pan-European  basis.  Another  key
Directive, the 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive, defines minimum capital requirements
(ranging between ECU  125,000 and ECU 730,000).  It also defines rules on capital for
different types of operators, requiring consolidation where two or more investment firms
belong to the same group.  In case there is a bank in the financial group, the banking
consolidation  Directive  applies.  No  agreement  however  has  been  reached  yet  on
eliminating national restrictions on investment portfolios by pension funds.
36.  What are the gaps in the Estonian Capital Markets Legislation?  The Estonian
Securities Market Act of 1993 provides the legal framework for the operation of Estonian
capital markets.  It has been amended several times, including  a recent amendment in
1997, to  reflect EU  Directives.  It  covers  general  aspects  concerning  the  issue  and
registration of securities, disclosure by issuers, licensing of brokers, definition of insiders,
and monitoring  and  supervision by the  Supervisory Board.  However, regulation  and
19  These items  will be incorporated  in the calculation  of the capital-adequacy  ratio.
20 The deposit insurance law that has been drafted will guarantee 90% of both private and company
deposits  up to a  maximum  of EKK 20,000 (ECU 1,250);  the limit will be gradually  increased  to ECU
20,000 over 15  years.
21 The Bank  of Estonia  has already  reached  a formal  agreement  with  the Bank  of Finland  on banking
supervision,  and is negotiating  similar  agreements  with  Latvia  and Russia.
16supervision of securities only covers EU Directives to a limited degree and constitutes the
weakest  spot  of  Estonian  securities  markets.  The  largest  regulatory  gap  is  on  the
application of the EU Capital Adequacy Directive. On the supervision side, there are no
clear rules and processes for supervisory authorities.  Also, the regulation of the Tallinn
Stock  Exchange  (currently  self-regulated)  greatly  constrains  the  enforcement  of  the
legislation.  There are limited reporting requirements and a lack of specificity in the rules
for transparency, disclosure of information, and insider trading.  The main exception to
the above concerns investment  funds.  The Investment  Funds  Act  of  1997 has  been
drafted with the objective of harmonization with the EU Investment Funds Directive.  As
a result, the effectiveness supervision of investment funds is more effective than that of
securities.
37.  Securities  brokers  recognize  the  need  for  strengthening  the  regulatory  and
supervisory framework of the  Securities Inspectorate.  Reliance on the self-regulatory
standards that the TSE and  ECD impose is perceived to  be inadequate in the  face of
prospective  market growth.  A larger market will make it more difficult for all market
participants  to  be  informed about the activities  of peers,  and  to  use peer pressure  to
enforce standards.  While the growing importance of self-regulation has played a positive
role  in  capital  market  development,  in  the  absence  of  enhanced  regulation  and
supervision, capital markets run the risk  of discouraging potential new entrants  - new
firms that join the TSE will seek comfort on legally binding regulatory mechanisms -
setting in motion anti-competitive pressures to the disadvantage of clients and the overall
reputation of the market.
38.  A new Securities Law, to be prepared during 1998, will improve harmonization
with the EU in the following areas: central register, primary  and secondary market  of
securities and investment services.  The Government plans (yet to be confirmed) suggest
that  rather  than  strengthening  the  existing  Securities  Inspectorate  (which  is  strongly
needed),  it  may  propose  a  merger  with  the  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  (to  be
established) that would be responsible for consolidated supervision.  This, in turn, may
facilitate the comprehensive implementation of the EU Capital Adequacy Directive that
will  apply both  to  banks  and  to  investment companies  competing  with banks  in  the
securities markets.
39.  Notwithstanding plans to establish consolidated financial sector supervision, the
Estonian  authorities  need  to  take  immediate  action  to  upgrade  the  capacity  of  the
Securities Inspectorate to effectively perform its responsibilities.  This includes revising
the Securities Law, spelling out clearer reporting requirements and  specifying rules for
transparency, disclosure of information, and restraining insider trading.  Amendments to
the legal framework need to be matched with better staffing and funding of the Securities
Inspectorate.  Authorities need to increase funding for the Securities Inspectorate through
special  budget  allocations,  such  as  the  reserve  fund,  or  funds  earmarked  for  EU
17integration.  In  the  1999,  funding  should  come  from  contributions  from  market
participants:  legislation needs to be modified to make this possible.
40.  There are two arguments for immediate action in upgrading the capacity of the
Securities Inspectorate.  First, the Securities Inspectorate is the weakest link in financial
sector supervision.  Delays in upgrading its supervisory powers and capacity pose a risk
to financial stability and growth.  Second, strengthening the Securities Inspectorate is an
important first step toward consolidated financial sector supervision, a key EU Accession
requirement, since consolidated supervision is more easily built from strong supervisory
agencies.
41.  Insurance.  EU Directives in the insurance sector follow the same principle as
those  in the Banking sector: free trade and  investment, mutual recognition and  home
couptry control.  A strict separation is maintained between life and non-life insurance.
The same Directive sets guidelines for solvency margins and requires a guarantee fund
and  defines  different  classes  of  life  insurance.  The  Insurance  Accounts  Directive
acknowledges the considerable convergence in the EU (for example, in terms of premium
calculation,  asset's  valuation,  investment  rules  and  policies)  in  non-life  insurance;
although there is  far less convergence for life insurance.  The latter Directive is aimed at
harmonizing  the  information  disclosure  needs  in  order  to  facilitate  the  standard  of
comparability  that  the  EU  internal  market  requires.  Later  amendments  dealt  with
harmonizing  regulatory  issues  such  as  large  shareholder  disclosure  rules,  and,  most
importantly, established the single license and home country rule (1992).
42.  What are the main gaps in Estonia insurance legislation?  The  1992 Estonian
Insurance Law provides the basic framework for regulating the life and non-life insurance
activities  in  Estonia.  While the  law  defines many of  the  EU requirements,  such  as
investment rules, solvency, licensing, and disclosure requirements, it lacks precision on
enforcement  procedures.  For  example, regulations  need  to  make  more  explicit  the
processes for calculating reserves, licensing and  supervising companies.  The law also
contains some inconsistencies.  It defines local government bonds as safe assets, despite
the recent Bank of Estonia decision to increase the risk attached to the bonds from 50% to
100% for the purpose of calculating bank capital adequacy ratios.  The Insurance Act
(currently under  preparation) will help to  address some of these weaknesses and  also
contains provisions on insurance supervision.  The institutional framework and capacities
for insurance supervision have yet to be developed.  Adequate supervision, therefore, is
the most  important barrier to  eventually join  the EU  internal market,  given the time,
continuous commitment anci  funds it requires.
18V.  PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN REGULATIONS AND
SUPERVISION
43.  The  integration  of  international  capital  markets,  the  creation  of  increasingly
complex contractual instruments, the unbundling of the components of risk into separate
financial  products,  and  the  rapid  growth  of  financial  conglomerates  enable  a  more
efficient financial intermediation.  These transformations also pose new challenges for the
regulation and supervision of  financial markets.  Estonia's  regulatory  and  supervisory
framework faces the formidable challenge of  simultaneously dealing  with  its  existing
weaknesses  while  adapting to  the rapidly  changing  environment characterized by  the
dismantling of geographic, functional, and institutional frontiers.
44.  The single most  important challenge  of  Estonia's  strategy  for financial  sector
integration  into  the  EU  is  the  further  upgrading  of  its  prudential  regulation  and
supervisory capacities to gain recognition from its EU counterparts. This also happens to
be  a  crucial  complement  to  macroeconomic  policy  and  the  stabilization  strategy,
particularly in view of the central role that banks play in the transmission mechanism of
capital flows under a currency board.  Indeed, under the currency board banks have been
able to arbitrage between domestic and foreign financial markets, increasingly funding
themselves abroad.  Such arbitrage has become the key funding source for a very rapid
credit expansion, contributing to the large current account deficit.  The risks associated
with an overheating of the economy, a possible deterioration of the quality of credit, and
market volatility in general justify the tightening of prudential regulation and supervision
pursued by the Estonian authorities.  These improvements in prudential regulations now
need to be followed by upgrading banks'  risk management systems (to manage the ever
more  complex  operations  and  diverse  markets  in  which  they  engage)  and  the
development of the country's  supervisory capacity.  This should be a priority because the
institutional  development of  banks and  the  supervision  authority  have lagged  behind
market developments.
45.  The proposed pre-accession strategy for Estonia's financial sector is as follows:
A.  Banking
=>  Conduct a  comprehensive diagnostic review of the  governance and  organizational
structure, staffing and remuneration arrangements of  the supervisory agency.  The
recommendations from such study should be aimed at (i) strengthening the autonomy
of the  agency:  (ii) facilitating the  training  and  retaining  of  its  personnel through
competitive salaries and better career prospects; (iii) reinforcing the on-site and off-
site  analytic  capabilities  (see  below),  including  through  the  hiring  of  external
auditors; and (iv) arranging programs of exchange with the EU to facilitate from the
outset the design of an institutional structure  acceptable by other EU agencies.  The
autonomy  for  the  supervisory  agency  could  be  strengthened  by,  for  example,
19entrusting  the  director and  board  of the agency  for  fixed term mandates,  and  by
placing the agency directly under the presidency of Bank of Estonia or a Committee
with wider representation including the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Estonia, and
the Prime Minister's  office.  Finally, the structure of the supervisory agency could be
strengthened by creating two separate units -- one responsible for regulatory policy,
another one responsible for investigation and  enforcement.
=  Raise the number and the skills of the staff in the supervisory agency.  Supervisors
should be trained to  detect cases of connected lending, which may be  shielded by
parallel companies; and identify cases in which overdue loans are rolled over or not
fully declared overdue.  For example, in some cases only the overdue interest and
principal are declared in default.  Training  on the job  is  crucial for this  purpose.
External auditors could, while performing their job,  provide training to the agency's
employees.  The agency could also seek technical assistance support and engage in
twinning arrangements with other agencies, possibly  from EU countries.  Donors'
grants to fund consultants that provide support in the field and to fund training abroad
of the  agency's  employees  will be  non-distortionary  and highly  beneficial  to  the
strengthening of the supervision function.
=> Speed  up  implement  plans  to  introduce  consolidated  supervision  for  banking,
insurance, securities, and, in the future, pensions.  While  consolidated supervision
may facilitate the comprehensive implementation of EU Capital Adequacy Directive,
it should not provide an excuse for delays and inaction in upgrading the country's
supervisory capacity under its current structure.  The Ministry of Finance and Bank of
Estonia should therefore consider the following intermediary steps: (i) an across the
board upgrading of supervisory agencies, (ii) the revision of secrecy provisions that
limit information flows across supervisory agencies and across country borders;  and
(iii) joint  on-site inspections and  off-site supervision exercises that  would prepare
staff for consolidated supervision.  The Bank of Estonia has taken the initiative to
require from the banking groups consolidated reports to be able to apply consolidated
reliability norms.  However, neither the Bank of Estonia, nor the Ministry of Finance
have taken steps to improve their capacity to carry out these new responsibilities.  The
Bank of Estonia's  Banking  Supervision Department and the Ministry  of Finance's
Securities  Inspectorate  are  still  understaffed  and  underfumded relative  to  what  is
needed to effectively perform their responsibilities.
=  Seek closer coordination with regulatory and supervisory agencies of the other Baltic
countries  and  other  neighboring  countries,  as  currently  planned  by  the  Bank  of
Estonia.  This  will become  increasingly  important as  Estonian banks  continue  to
expand into neighboring countries - particularly the other Baltics - and banks from
neighboring countries enter Estonia.  The large Estonian commercial banks are also
targeting  the  Saint  Petersburg  area  in  Russia.  Collaboration  with  the  Russian
authorities may also prove to be mutually convenient.  Similarly, building working
relationships with EU counterparts and maintaining the on-going relationship with the
20Basle Committee of  Banking Supervision will in the end  be critical for  a smooth
transition to EU membership and to remain abreast of major trends in  supervision,
particularly, consolidated supervision.
Proceed with the planned introduction of regulations to  deal with  a number of key
market risks, scheduled for April, 1998.  The new market risks to be covered include:
equity risks and underwriting commitment risks.  The former should be measured on
a gross basis and applied to the minimum capital adequacy requirements of both the
credit institution and the consolidated banking group.  There is also a need to make
more  explicit  the  regulation  for  provisioning  against  bad  credits.  The  present
regulation concedes considerable amount of discretion to  supervisors in determining
on  a case by case basis  whether the  corresponding bank  is pursuing  conservative
practices or not for loans overdue less than 150 days.  This will facilitate the work of
the supervisor and eliminate the scope for subjective and inconsistent treatment across
banks or over time.  Estonia should also consider regulating interest rate risks.
=>  Increase the transparency of information and the frequency of disclosure of bank's
risks to the supervisory agency and to the broader public.  The commercial banks
should report to the Bank of Estonia on an on-line basis:  daily money market and
overnight market positions, balance sheets including forward exchange rate contracts
every  10 days;  monthly  Capital Adequacy Rate  and  liquidity  positions;  quarterly
profit and losses; and annual ownership structure.  All this information should also be
made  available  to  the public.  This  will  facilitate the  monitoring  of  bank's  own
creditworthiness  and liquidity situation  by depositors and  institutions that  perform
credit risk analysis.  The above list of indicators to be disclosed could be widened to
include  specific  indicators  of market  risk  (such as interest  rate  risk,  underwriting
commitment risk, equity risk), the share of foreign currency loans of borrowers with a
net  foreign  currency  cash  flow,  as  well  as  a  domestic  credit  rating  from  an
independent and reputable credit rating agency.  In particular, disclosure of the risks
which  the bank's  own risk  management  systems identifies  as critical  can help to
impose discipline on market participants.
=  Revise the proposed deposit insurance law required for EU accession.  There is an
inconsistency between the Credit Institutions  Law and the draft Deposit Insurance
Law.  In its  present  form, the  Credit Institutions  Law  suggests that  the  Bank  of
Estonia would intervene in banks in case of a financial crisis.  This creates ambiguity
about who intervenes in insolvent banks, and when.  It also raises questions about the
purpose of the Deposit Insurance Fund.  Indeed, if the Bank of Estonia intervenes to
avoid losses to depositors and shareholders, as in the case of the North Estonian Bank
and the Social Bank, the Deposit Insurance Fund becomes unnecessary. The Estonian
authorities may wish therefore to ensure that the passage of the Deposit  Insurance
Law is accompanied by comprehensive provisions to deal with bank insolvency in the
Credit Institutions Law.  This  is critical to strengthen the credibility of a  possible
bank  liquidation,  facilitating  supervision and  early  intervention.  Once  the Credit
21Institutions Law is amended to clarify the role of the Bank of Estonia as a lender of
last  resort,  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  would  be  an  integral  element  of  bank
bankruptcy procedures.  The existence of a  Deposit Insurance Law will  allow the
Bank of Estonia to intervene whenever there is the need without concern about the
potential  cost to  small depositors.  An adequately funded  Deposit  Insurance Fund
would  ensure that  the  loss to  small  depositors,  those  less  able  to  monitor  risky
behavior by banks, would be minimal.
=>  Training of the treasury departments of commercial banks in currency and interest
rate hedging, as well as in risk management of options and derivatives trading.  The
implementation of asset-liability risk management systems needs to be extended to all
commercial  banks,  particularly  the  smaller  ones.  On-site  training  and  twinning
arrangements are likely to be the most effective.  Credit risk capabilities, particularly
of the smaller and medium-sized banks, need to be strengthened since the large banks
are  so  far  leading  the  efforts  in  training.  Short  credit  histories  and  relatively
inexperienced  analysts  are  shortcomings  that  could  be  compensated  with  more
conservative  economic  and  financial  scenarios and  greater  reliance  on  cash-flow
analysis.  Smaller banks in particular rely excessively on collateral securities, often
misjudging.  Some of the larger banks use instead  independent valuators.
=> Financial and  technical  innovation  and the pace  of  growth  of banks  ought  to  be
balanced against the need to radically increase efficiency.  There is the need to reduce
costs and, possibly, employment.  Overstaffing could erode profit margins in view of
the relatively fast wage growth of skilled labor and increased competition in the wake
of EU accession.  The fast expansion of Estonian banks, both  domestically and in
neighboring  countries, provides  an  opportunity to  exploit  economies  of  scale and
scope, and of technical efficiency in general.
B.  Capital Markets and Insurance
46.  While most of the efforts to bridge the regulatory gaps are correctly pointed at the
banking system, Estonia also needs to develop a complete, consistent and effective
regulatory framework for capital markets.  For completeness, the Estonian capital
markets regulatory framework needs to include segments which are currently unregulated
such as pensions, corporate, mortgage and municipal bonds.  For consistency it needs to
apply a basic common set of principles.  A guiding principle in the elaboration of such
framework is that it should avoid creating incentives for market participants to engage in
regulatory arbitrage by placing the securities activities under oversight of the regulator
with the least burdensome requirements; for instance, banks and broker-dealers engaging
in securities activities or pension funds and life insurance companies engaged in the
administration of pension schemes. The key elements to achieve these two objective are
the following:
22Avoid incentives for tax arbitrage that leads to the artificial creation of intermediaries
to minimize the tax bill.  For example, the income tax on insurance premiums is very
low (1%), especially when compared to other forms of financial intermediation.  This
simply creates artificial (and socially costly) financial intermediaries.  The Estonian
authorities need to remedy this problem by setting the income tax on premiums at the
same level as other sources of income (26%), and then make insurance policies tax
deductible, like in most other countries, since it is a regular cost of business operation.
*  Harmonize the EU Directive on capital adequacy needs that will be applied on a
consolidated basis.  At present banks are more heavily regulated and supervised than
securities firms.  The latter need also be subject to greater scrutiny, tightening rules
and regulations on information disclosure and transparency, and insider trading.  This
will require strengthening the supervisory agencies, particularly the Insurance and the
Securities Boards.  This includes dealing with the staffing and training needs,
upgrading reporting requirements, information systems, and application of licensing
standards.  This also includes granting greater autonomy to the Boards, reducing staff
turnover through better pay and increasing the power to enforce regulations.  Finally,
other recommendation made above for banking supervision also applies to capital
markets and insurance.  For instance, training on the job by on-the-field consultants
and twinning arrangements would greatly improve Estonia's regulatory capacity in
these fields.
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